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REFLAGGING A VESSEL IN THE EUROPEAN
MARKET AND DEALING WITH TRANSNATIONAL
COLLECTIVE DISPUTES: ITF & FINNISH
SEAMEN’S UNION V. VIKING LINE
Patrick Chaumette*

I. INTRODUCTION
Before the rulings were even handed down by the Court of Justice of
the European Community (ECJ) in December of 2007, much ink had
flowed on the subject of the Viking Line and Laval & Partnery
judgments.1 The conclusions delivered by Advocates General Poiares
Maduro and Paolo Mengozzi, together with the Court’s judgments,2
subsequently gave rise to numerous commentaries in European Union
(EU) Member States. These rulings interested a wide range of legal
scholars and experts in international law and labor law, as well as
* Professor at the University of Nantes Center of Maritime and Ocean Law,
Associate Member of Law and Social Change. This article was translated from its
original French by Janet Heard-Carnot.
1. See Kerstin Ahlberg, Niklas Bruun & Jonas Malmberg, The Vaxholm Case from a
Swedish and European Perspective, 12 TRANSFER 155 (2006); Thomas Blanke, The
Viking Case, 12 TRANSFER 251 (2006); Tania Novitz, The Right to Strike and Re-flagging
in the European Union: Free Movement Provisions and Human Rights, 33 LLOYD’S
MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY [LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L. Q.] 242 (2006)
(Gr. Brit.); Giovanni Orlandini, Diritto di Sciopero, Azioni Collettive Transnazionali e
Mercato Interno dei Servizi : Nuovi Dilemmi e Nuovi Scenari per il Diritto Sociale
Europeo, 45 WORKING PAPERS CENTRO STUDI DI DIRITTO DEL LAVORO EUROPO
“MASSIMO D’ANTONA” [WP C.S.D.L.E.] (2006) (Italy); BRIAN BERCUSSON, COLLECTIVE
ACTION AND ECONOMIC FREEDOMS BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 40-45
(ETUI-REHS, Brussels) (2007); Brian Bercusson, The Trade Union Movement and the
European Union: Judgment Day, 13 EUR. L.J. 279 (2007); Mikaela Bjorkholm,
Safeguarding EC Fundamental Freedoms: Are Ship Blockades Exempt from the Freedom
of Movement Rules?, 25 ANNUAIRE DE DROIT MARITIME ET OCÉANIQUE 103 (2007) (Fr.).
2. Case C-438/05, Int’l Transport Workers’ Fed’n v. Viking Line ABP, 2007 E.C.R.
I-10779; Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet,
2007 E.C.R. I-11767.
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workers, employers, and professionals in the European Community.
Fierce debate sparked when those close to the jurisdiction explained that
these classic decisions could not be otherwise, even though the decisions
were not in line with the conclusions of the two advocates generals.
However, if it is true that these decisions could not have any other
outcome, why did the European Parliament issue a report,3 and why was
there a state of turmoil at the International Labour Organization in
Geneva?
The proximity of the two judgments shows the similarity of themes
related to the international mobility of undertakings and of workers. The
Viking Line case concerned ferries crossing the Baltic Sea, the reflagging
of a vessel, and companies’ freedom of establishment in the Common
Market. A Finnish ship-owner, who was losing money on his ferry line
between Finland and Estonia, wanted to register his ferryboat “The
Rosella” in Estonia to take advantage of a cheaper Estonian crew. The
Finnish Seamen’s Association and the International Transport Workers’
Federation (ITF) campaigned to ensure that the Estonian Seamen’s
Union would not sign a collective agreement. ITF also sought assurance
that if “The Rosella” was reflagged, the ship-owner would comply with
Finnish law and would keep the existing crew. Confronted by this
industrial action, the ship-owner began legal proceedings in London to
prohibit ITF and its subsidiary from hindering the ferry’s reflagging.
The Court of Appeals in London referred the case to the ECJ for
preliminary issues of interpretation.
In the Laval & Partnery case, a Latvian company, “Laval,” won a
contract to renovate a school building in Sweden. Laval intended to
subcontract part of the work to its Swedish subsidiary, “Baltic Bygg,”
using posted workers. The case hinged on businesses’ freedom to
provide services within the Common Market. When negotiations
between Laval and the Swedish trade union broke down, the unions
blockaded the building site in an attempt to force the Latvian undertaking
into signing the Swedish collective agreement for building trades and
public works. Was this obstructive action on the worksite compatible
with directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of
December 16, 1996 on the posting of workers in the framework of the
provision of services,4 and with the principle of non-discrimination? As
3. Report on Challenges to Collective Agreement in the EU, EUR. PARL. DOC. A60370/2008 (Sept. 30, 2008).
4. Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of
services, 1997 O.J. (L 18) 1-6 (EC).
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a result of the blockade, Baltic Bygg filed for bankruptcy because it had
no activity in the country where its headquarters were located.
In both cases, the national judges questioned who had legal
jurisdiction over these transnational union actions. Could a threat of
collective action in Finland be subject to British law because ITF’s
headquarters are in London? Would blocking a Swedish worksite come
under Swedish law alone? Furthermore, would the transnational nature
of collective action conflict with Community Law of the Internal
Market? These two cases are also related to the European Union’s
poorly controlled process of enlargement that took place in 2004 and that
led to two negative outcomes for referendums in the Netherlands and in
France in 2005.
Companies often take advantage of social differentials in terms of
pay and social protection, either by postings on land in the economic area
or by reflagging a vessel. One example is Irish Ferries. In one instance,
an Irish company plying a cross-Channel route that flagged its vessels in
Cyprus fired its Irish seamen and hired seafarers from Baltic countries
for regular ferry links between Ireland, Wales, and France. The company
ultimately complied with the minimum wage in Ireland to put an end to
the social conflict it had engendered.5
Allegation of union responsibility due to transnational collective
actions forced the Court of Justice to make an initial decision about
jurisdiction, including which judge is competent to hear a case.6 The
Swedish Seamen’s Union threatened to blockade a Danish vessel in
Sweden that belonged to a Danish ship-owner, was flagged under the
international Danish registry, and was manned by cheaper Polish
seafarers, in order to operate a regular line between Sweden and the
United Kingdom (U.K.).7 Ship-owners employ rights inherent to

5. Patrick Chaumette, Du portuaire et de la nouvelle bataille du Transmanche. Soeur
Anne, soeur Anne, ne vois-tu rien venir?, 667 LE DROIT MARITIME FRANCAIS [D.M.F.] 99
(2006) (Fr.); Patrick Chaumette, Marine marchande, navigations et espaces juridiques, in
LES TRANSPORTS MARITIMES DANS LA MONDIALISATION 233 (Jacques Guillaume ed.,
L’Harmattan 2008).
6. Case C-18/02, Danmarks Rederiforening v. LO Landsorganisationen i Sverige,
2004 E.C.R. I-1417; see also Olga Fotinopolou Basurko, Competencia judicial
internacional en materia de responsabilidad sindical por conflicto entablado frente a
empresario marítimo - Indicios de debilitamiento del pabellón como referencia para
vincular el buque a un Estado concreto, 26 REVISTA DE DERECHO SOCIAL 99 (2004)
(Spain); Patrick Chaumette, Fragment d’un droit des conflits internationaux du travail?,
3 DROIT SOCIAL 295 (2005); Etienne Pataut, La grève dans les rapports internationaux de
travail : question de qualification, 3 DROIT SOCIAL 303 (2005).
7. See Danmarks Rederiforening, 2004 E.C.R. I-1417.
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freedom of establishment principles to reduce the cost of social
contributions by flagging a vessel on the so-called international registry,
which is adapted to global competition for vessels to be flagged freely,
even when considering a regular line running geographically between
Community countries. Social competition for “low cost” workers seems
to be boundless. Legal recourse with respect to the licitness of a threat to
strike applies to “matters of tort” as governed by Article 5.3 of the
December 27, 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.8 The
plaintiff has the option of choosing either the court where the offence
took place or where the defendant is domiciled. But where did the
damage actually take place? Should the place where the causal event
occurred have more importance than the place where the harm occurred?
Damage resulting from a trade union’s industrial action in a Contracting
State to which a ship registered in another Contracting State sails must
not necessarily be regarded as occurring in the flag State, with the result
that the ship-owner can bring an action for damages against that trade
union in the flag State. In that case, the place where the event likely to
give rise to tortious liability for the person responsible for the act could
only be Sweden, since that is the place where the harmful event
originated.9 It is for the national court to inquire whether such financial
loss may be regarded as having arisen at the place where the enterprise is
established. In that case, the Danish ship-owner could lay the matter
before a Danish court to examine the legality of collective actions in
Sweden. The territorial nature of the strike is asserted, but not
exclusively so, meaning that the Court left the national judge with some
leeway for action. In the course of that assessment by the national court,
the flag State, i.e. the State where the ship is registered, must be regarded
as being only one factor among others that can help determine where the
harmful event took place. The nationality of the ship could only play a
decisive role if the national court reached the conclusion that the damage
arose on board the Tor Caledonia, in this instance. In the latter case, the
flag State must necessarily be regarded as the place where the harmful
event caused damage.10

8. See Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters, art. 5(3), Sept. 27, 1968, O.J. L/299/32,
available at curia.europa.eu/common/recdoc/convention/en/c-textes/brux-idx.htm.
9. Danmarks Rederiforening, 2004 E.C.R. I-1417 at para. 41.
10. Etienne Pataut, Cour de justice des Communautes européennes, 93: 4 REVUE
CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE [R.C.D.I.P.] 791 (2004) (Fr.); Case C-168/02,
Kronhofer v. Maier, 2004 E.C.R. I-6009, I-6019, para. 44 (“[T]he expression ‘place
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II. WHAT ARE THE COMMUNITY JURISDICTIONS?
The Viking Line and Laval & Partnery decisions raised even more
fundamental issues about which legal system applies for transnational
collective actions in the European area than did Tor Line. It was
conceivable that even the Court of Justice would not be competent. Just
like the Social Policy Agreement of April 7, 1992, appended to the
Maastricht Treaty of the same date, Article 2, Section 6 of the Treaty of
Amsterdam of October 2, 1997 excluded the EU’s competence (granted
by Article 137 of the EC Treaty on pay), the right of association, the
right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs (meaning respectively
wages set by employers and workers), union freedoms and rights, and the
right to collective labor action.11
Neither the Council nor the
Commission could take measures on these subjects because they fall
under the jurisdiction of Member States. This meant that the Court of
Justice could refer the questions brought before it to national courts
which would apply national legislation.
In 1992, the House of Lords took the grounds of the law on
collective bargaining, making the Swedish collective agreement a form
of non-binding, gentlemen’s agreement. Subjected to common law and
excluded from trade union immunities, this collective contract was
considered null and void because it was signed under constraint.12 As a
result of boycott action while the vessel was in a Swedish port, the owner
of a Panamanian vessel signed contracts with its Greek and Filipino
seafarers, compliant with ITF standards, and then sued ITF in the British
courts to recover the sums.13 According to the House of Lords, British
courts were competent to rule on a lawsuit of this type, because the
collective agreement is governed by British law, which was the
collective autonomy law explicitly chosen by the contracting parties.14
Furthermore, ITF’s headquarters are in London. Although the conflict
where the harmful event occurred’ does not refer to the place where the claimaint is
domiciled or where ‘his assets are concentrated’ by reason only of the fact that he has
suffered financial damage there resulting from the loss of a part of his assets which arose
and was incurred in another Contracting State.”).
11. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
Article
137(5),
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/htm/C_2002325EN.
003301.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (“The provisions of this article shall not apply to
pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs.”).
12. See Dimskal Shipping v. International Transport Workers’ Federation (The “Evia
Luck” (No. 2)), [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 115 (H.L.).
13. See id.
14. See id.
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took place in Sweden and this boycott was legal under Swedish law, the
agreement was null and void under common law; the ship-owner could
claim to have the sums paid to ITF under constraint returned.15
According to the British judge, the Swedish collective dispute and the
British collective bargaining agreement (which was the outcome of the
dispute) had to be considered separately.16
In conclusion, the nullity of the contract signed incurred the liability
of the international union behind the licit collective conflict in Sweden.17
Although the application of British common law was not to the liking of
the Finnish Seamen’s Union with respect to Viking Line, contrary to
Finnish law, applying Swedish law made the boycott of the school
building worksite legal and required compliance with conventional
wages by the Swedish unions in the Laval & Partnery case.
Transnational collective disputes would thus fall under the patchwork of
national legislations, depending on the connections between the place
where collective action took place and the headquarters of the entities
involved.18
III. INTERNAL MARKET LAW TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER THE LACK OF
COMMUNITY JURISDICTION
The Court of Justice of the European Communities acts as a
Constitutional court. It can take action in matters where the Council of
the European Union and the European Commission do not have
competence. This seems obvious once economic freedoms, freedom of
establishment for undertakings, or free movement of workers are or may

15. PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 495 (Oxford
University Press 2d ed. 2007); Keith Ewing, British Labour Law and Private
International Law Report, in 13 CROSS-BORDER COLLECTIVE ACTIONS IN EUROPE: A
LEGAL CHALLENGE - A STUDY OF THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE
ACTIONS FROM A LABOUR LAW AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 226
(Filip Dorssemont, Teun Jaspers, & Aukje Van Hoek eds., 2007).
16. See Dimskal Shipping, 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 115 (H.L.).
17. Patrick Chaumette, Les actions collectives syndicales dans le maillage des libertés
communautaires des entreprises, 2 DROIT SOCIAL 210 (2008).
18. See Filip Dorssemont, Labor Law Issues of Transnational Collective Action –
Comparative Report, in 13 CROSS-BORDER COLLECTIVE ACTIONS IN EUROPE: A LEGAL
CHALLENGE - A STUDY OF THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE ACTIONS
FROM A LABOUR LAW AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 245 (Filip
Dorssemont, Teun Jaspers, & Aukje Van Hoek eds., 2007).
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be challenged.19 The social aims pursued by the European Community
are part of creating the Internal Market, where social rules are designed
to guarantee workers’ rights and make conditions for competition more
equal. This dual objective was likewise that of the International Labour
Organization as of 1919. The preamble to the Treaty of Versailles of
June 28, 1919 states that universal peace can be established only if it is
based upon social justice, and that failure of any nation to adopt humane
conditions of labor is an obstacle impeding other nations that desire to
improve the conditions in their own countries. Internal Market law is
formed by EC law on competition, free movement of goods, people,
services, and capital. The general impression has been that Community
social law tends to be absorbed into the general aim of the Internal
Market’s operation.20 Only the principles of non-discrimination, gender
equality for employment, and protection of health and safety at work
clearly emphasize the protection of people’s fundamental rights. The
progressive emergence of European citizenship does not disconnect EC
law from economics, even when it lends a non-utilitarian dimension to
the freedom of movement of individuals.21
Consequently, economic freedom and social rights must be
reconciled. The Court of Justice recalled that Articles 39 EC on the
freedom of movement for workers, 43 EC on the right of establishment,
and 49 EC on the freedom to provide services do not only regulate the
action of public authorities, but also extend to regulations of another type
that aim to collectively regulate salaried employment, independent
employment, and provision of services. Collective actions by trade
unions theoretically fall under the scope of application of Article 43 EC.
In the Schmidberger and Omega rulings, the Court of Justice of the
European Communities judged that exercising the fundamental rights in
question—freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and respect for
human dignity—did indeed fall within the scope of application of the
Treaty’s provisions. The Court considered that this exercise should be
reconciled with requirements related to the rights protected by the Treaty
of Freedom of Movement of Goods and Freedom of Provision of

19. PIERRE RODIÈRE, DROIT SOCIAL DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE 48-49, 448-52 (LGDJ,
3d ed. 2008).
20. LAETITIA DRIGUEZ, DROIT SOCIAL ET DROIT DE LA CONCURRENCE 41-42 (Bruylant
2006).
21. SANDRINE MAILLARD, L’ÉMERGENCE DE LA CITOYENNETÉ SOCIALE EUROPÉENNE
155-82 (Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille - Puam 2008).
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Services, as well as complying with the principle of proportionality.22 In
regard to the collective bargaining agreements concerning labor and
management, social policy objectives should not be considered as falling
under Article 81, Section 1 of the Treaty, which prohibits agreements
restricting competition. Further, Article 81, Section 1 does not cover the
Community law on competition,23 and it is impossible to transpose this
reasoning to the fundamental freedoms set out in Title III of the
aforementioned Treaty. Flagging of a vessel is indivisible from
exercising freedom of establishment when the vessel in question
provides the instrument to exercise an economic activity, set up in a
stable manner in a Member State of registration.24 Article 43 asserts the
freedom of establishment and may be directly relied upon by a private
undertaking against a trade union or an association of trade unions, even
though Finnish law gives unions the right to take collective action.25
Marc Fallon has noted that it is not surprising that workers’ social
rights be addressed from the angle of economic freedoms of
entrepreneurs. This approach has come from the decisions in the Rush
Portuguesa and Vander Elst cases, which address freedom of service
provisions by employers that enable an extension of freedom of
movement for posted workers.26 Therefore, it must be verified whether
the application of a regulation from national law, in this case, dealing
with the right to collective action by workers and their trade unions,
constituting an ordinarily forbidden curb on functioning of the Internal

22. Case C-112/00, Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Austria,
2003 E.C.R. I-5659; Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen-und AutomatenaufstellungsGmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, 2004 E.C.R. I-9609; LAETITIA
DRIGUEZ, supra note 20, at 39-41, 765-68.
23. Case C-67/96, Albany Int’l BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds
Textielindustrie, 1999 E.C.R. I-5751; Daniel Gadbin, Les fonds de pension obligatoires
face au droit communautaire de la concurrence : des positions dominantes à préserver
dans le futur marché intérieur des services financiers, 2 DROIT SOCIAL 178 (2001);
Christophe Vigneau, De la soustraction des accords collectifs aux règles
communautaires de la concurrence, J.C.P./La Semaine Juridique 2001-E-1032 (Fr.).
24. Case C-221/89, The Queen v. The Sec’y of State for Transp., ex parte Factorame
LTD, 1991 E.C.R. I-3905; Case C-334/94, Commisson v. French Republic, 1996 E.C.R.
I-1307; DROITS MARITIMES ¶ 212.11 (Jean-Pierre Beurier, ed., Éditions Dalloz 2006).
25. Case C-438/05, Int’l Transp. Workers’ Fed’n v. Viking Line ABP, 2007 E.C.R. I10779, I-10801-I-10802, paras. 61, 63.
26. See Marc Fallon, Le détachement européen des travailleurs à la croisée de deux
logiques conflictualistes, 97: 4 R.C.D.I.P. 781 (2008); Case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa
Lda v. Office National de l’Immigration, 1990 E.C.R. I-1417; Case C-43/93, Raymond
Vander Elst v. Office des Migrations Internationales, 1994 E.C.R. I-3803.
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Market, could be found to be objectively justified and proportional to the
justification cited.27
IV. JUSTIFICATION OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
The collective action taken to implement the policy to combat flags
of convenience pursued by ITF, which mainly aims to prevent shipowners from registering their vessels in a State other than that of which
the beneficial owners are nationals, should be considered (at the very
least) as designed to restrict Viking Line exercising its right to free
establishment.
The right to take collective action aiming to protect workers
substantiates a legitimate interest justifying, on principle, the restriction
of one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty.
Additionally, protecting workers is one of the overriding public interest
reasons already acknowledged by the Court. Collective actions, like
collective bargaining and collective agreements, may make up, in the
specific circumstances of a case, one means for trade unions to protect
their members’ interests. The Court of Justice refers to the case law of
the European Court of Human Rights on this point.28 That is why a large
proportion of legal scholars in France saw these two decisions as
recognizing social rights, before their analysis of the arbitration led to
their disappointment regarding this theory. Since the Community has
both an economic and a social purpose, the rights ensuing from the
provisions of the treaty with respect to free movement of goods, people,
services, and capital must be weighed in balance with the social policy
objectives pursued. Amongst the latter are notably (as per Article 136,
paragraph 1, EC) improved living and working conditions, so as to make
possible their harmonization while the improvement is being maintained;
proper social protection; and dialogue between management and labor.
If trade union actions intended to ensure a collective work agreement
with an undertaking established in another Member State constitute a
restriction for freedom of establishment, that restriction may, in
principle, be justified by public interest, such as the protection of
workers, but only if it is established that the restriction is suited to attain

27. Pierre Rodière, Les arrêts Viking et Laval, le droit de grève et le droit de
négociation collective, 44: 1 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEEN [R.T.D. Eur.]
47 (2008) (Fr.).
28. See National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R., (ser. A)
(1975); Wilson, National Union of Journalists, and Others v. United Kingdom, 2002-V
Eur. Ct. H.R. 523, 534.
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the legitimate objective pursued and does not go beyond what is needed
to achieve that objective.29
V. COLLECTIVE ACTION AS THE ULTIMATE WEAPON
The Court of Justice left it to the British courts to determine whether
the aims pursued by the trade unions, through the collective action taken,
concerned the protection of workers. Were jobs or working conditions
aboard the Rosella ferryboat jeopardized or seriously threatened? This
would not be the case if the ship-owner had undertaken to avoid ending
the lasting employment of all crew members due to the reflagging, if this
commitment’s scope was as binding as the stipulations of a collective
agreement, if it guaranteed workers compliance with legal provisions,
and if the provisions of the collective agreement governing their working
relations were to be maintained. The court the case was referred to had
to verify whether the collective union action was appropriate to
guarantee reaching the goal set, i.e. maintaining jobs and working
conditions, and did not go beyond what was necessary to achieve this
objective. Did not the trade union have other means at its disposal which
were less restrictive of freedom of establishment in order to bring
collective negotiations to a successful conclusion? Had that trade union
exhausted those means before initiating such action under the applicable
national rules and collective agreement law?30
The British judge did not intervene, since an agreement was struck
between ITF and Viking Line to put an end to the dispute. As seen from
the United Kingdom, this decision was certainly an advance, explaining
the relief of David Cockroft, ITF Secretary General, who stated: “We
welcome the Court’s assertion that the right to take collective action including the right to strike - is a fundamental right . . . .”31 However,
the ruling challenges the very idea of combating the use of flags of
convenience, led by ITF since 1948 and based on registry of a vessel in a
State other than that of which the beneficial owners are nationals. The
statutes of ITF require it, when asked by one of its members, to initiate
solidarity action against the beneficial owner of a vessel which is
registered in a State other than that of which that owner is a national.
Whether or not that owner’s exercise of its right of freedom of
29. Viking Line ABP, 2007 E.C.R. I-10779 at I-10838, para. 90.
30. Id. at I-10837, para. 87.
31. International Transport Workers’ Federation, ITF welcomes court assertion on the
right
to
take
collective
action,
http://www.itfglobal.org/newsonline/index.cfm/newsdetail/1705 (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
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establishment is liable to have a harmful effect on the work or conditions
of employment of its employees was not an issue. The Court of Justice
imposes this in the frame of Community market law. Can ITF continue
to reserve the right to collectively negotiate for trade unions of seafarers
in the State where the beneficial owner is a national,32 when freedom of
establishment alters the conditions under which vessels are operated,
particularly on regular lines, when the ship-owner’s functions are
dispersed? How should the stable establishment for operating a vessel be
defined in order to restore the substantial link between the vessel and the
State whose flag it flies?
Although ITF must certainly adapt its doctrine to the modern
management methods of global ship-owners whose location cannot be
limited to the headquarters of the parent company, and whose
registrations must go beyond the dimension of beneficial ownership,
developing international collective bargaining should be promoted by
international, regional, and national organizations, and even by the Court
of Justice of the European Communities. In terms of pay and social
protection for seafarers, it is mainly unilateral action by ITF that has
enabled about fifty-five percent of the modern merchant fleet to be
covered by collective agreements. Thus, ship-owners obtain the blue
ticket, which simplifies shipping and contributes to the seafarers’
Welfare Fund.
ITF inspectors are present in 47 countries. An International
Bargaining Forum (IBF) agreement was signed on November 13, 2003
which significantly changed the way ITF standards will be applied
aboard vessels. It is an agreement between ITF and the Joint Negotiating
Group (JNG) with seventy-five ship owners from the twenty-four
countries in the International Maritime Employers’ Committee (IMEC),
and those of Japan represented by their own association called the
International Mariners Management Committee of Japan (IMMAJ).33
32. See H.R. NORTHRUP & R.L. ROWAN, THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT WORKERS’
FEDERATION AND FLAG OF CONVENIENCE SHIPPING (Industrial Research Unit, Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania 1983); Patrick Chaumette, Le Droit du Travail des
Gens de Mer en Chantier-Deconstruction/Reconstruction, 106: 4 IL DIRITTO MARITTIMO
1223 (2004) (Italy).
33. See International Transport Workers’ Federation, Joint Statement from IBF (10/6),
http://www.seafarers.org/HeardAtHQ/2005/Q4/ibfstate.xml (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
55,000 seamen from 3200 vessels are covered by the International Bargaining Forum
agreement drawn up by the ITF and IMEC. Id. See also REYNALD BOURQUE, LES
ACCORDS-CADRES INTERNATIONAUX ET LA NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE INTERNATIONALE À
L’ÈRE DE LA MONDIALISATION, DOCUMENT DU TRAVAIL 24 (International Institute for
Labour
Studies,
Education
Series
2005)
(Switz.),
available
at

12

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:1

The ITF collective agreement, which is traditionally accompanied by
issuance of a blue ticket – certifying that the vessel is covered by a
classic ITF TCC agreement with an AB seaman’s wage set at $1,400 –
will remain in effect, but will be replaced whenever possible by the IBF
agreement which gives the right to a green ticket. This agreement is the
outcome of discussion and negotiation over a ten year period.34
The agreement legitimizes ITF’s action and sets it in the context of
collective bargaining. It was noted in 2007, at the International
Bargaining Forum in London, that the agreement applies to 70,000
seafarers and 3500 vessels. The development of piracy off the coast of
Somalia led to specific negotiation in 2008 in order to double the wages
in this war-risk area.
VI. ON REFLAGGING A VESSEL
Is reflagging a vessel a form of relocation? What effects does
reflagging have on seafarers’ contracts of employment or their collective
agreements? The question was either not asked, or received a simple and
obvious response, when Flag State law was the shared law on board, or
when there was a substantiated link between the State of registry and the
vessel’s operation on a regularly plied line. But from now on, the
question will be raised. The issue is of particular interest to those
involved in international law, either in the context of national
international registries created by various European countries, or within
the framework of the dispute on maritime employment concerning
yachting, particularly in the Mediterranean.
The question of the substantial link between the vessel and maritime
occupation arises when the ship is registered in a place that may have no
connection with its operation. This presents a conflict of jurisdiction,
and the competent court must be determined. Can a yacht flagged in
Luxembourg or Guernsey and used for sailing in the Mediterranean lead
to the court of the place of the managing firm of the seafarer’s employer
when the contract was signed in a recruiting firm or manning agency in
another place? Vessels are made to sail, and the administrative home

http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/publications/discussion/dp16105.pdf;
Nathan Lillie, Global Collective Bargaining on Flag of Convenience Shipping, 42: 1
BRITISH JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 47 (March 2004); Nathan Lillie, Union
Networks and Global Unionism in Maritime Shipping, 60: 1 RELATIONS
INDUSTRIELLES/INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 88 (2005) (Can.).
34. James Smith, Le Passage du Blue Ticket au Green Ticket, 22 ANNUAIRE DE DROIT
MARITIME ET OCÉANIQUE 265 (2004).

2010]

Transnational Collective Disputes

13

port is often entirely different from its actual home port. Council
Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of December 22, 2000 on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters is currently being interpreted.35
The usual place of work is where the employee habitually carries
out most of his/her working time on behalf of the employer,
taking account of the worker’s entire period of activity. In the
case of stable periods of work in successive different places, the
last place of activity should be chosen, when in accordance with
the clear will of the parties, it was decided that the worker
exercised his activities there in a stable and lasting way.36
For a seafarer, this is no longer the Flag State law. The industrial
tribunal in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern had questioned the European
Court of Justice about this very explicitly, but the case was struck off the
roll.37 This substantial link raises questions about both the conflict of
jurisdictions and the conflict of laws.
With respect to the Convention of Rome of June 19, 1980 and the
conflict of laws, since the vessel is not a territory and since the seafarer
can carry out his work in the waters or even the harbors of different
States, for Professor Paul Lagarde, designating the law of the place
where the work is habitually carried out, i.e. lex laboris, has no possible
application.38 Marc Fallon shares this analysis, which no longer makes
Flag State law the common law on board, but rather corresponds to free
flagging of the vessel. In regard to private international law, it is not
certain whether reflagging a vessel will lead to a modification in the law
applicable to the seafarers’ contracts of employment. For a regular
shipping line, Finnish seafarers who are recruited and reside in Finland
can be considered to carry out their work in that country.39 The flag is a
choice of commercial, fiscal, and social management. It can no longer
be a single indicator of the vessel’s ties. In the opinion of Horatia Muir35. Regulation No. 44/2001 (O.J.E.C. 2001 L 12, 1).
36. Patrick Chaumette, Quel lieu habituel de travail pour le marin international?, 6
DROIT SOCIAL 733 (2009).
37. Case C-413/07, Haase v. Superfast Ferries SA, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:051:0040:0040:EN:pdf; OLGA
FOTINOPOULOU BASURKO, EL PROCESO LABORAL INTERNACIONAL EN EL DERECHO
COMUNITARIO 128 (CES de Andalucía, Sevilla 2008).
38. Paul Lagarde, A propos de la loi française n° 2005-412 du 3 mai 2005 créant le
registre international français (RIF) des navires, 94: 3 R.C.D.I.P. 527 (2005).
39. Marc Fallon, Le détachement européen des travailleurs à la croisée de deux
logiques conflictualistes, 97: 4 R.C.D.I.P. 781 (2008).
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Watt, the flag is not transparent: in the case of reflagging, Estonian law
(which is the law of the new establishment and affords less protection)
thus becomes applicable in the future to individual relations of labor
disputes.40
Is it therefore necessary to have recourse to the Convention of Rome
rule of subsidiarity, which invokes the law of the country of the
undertaking that hired the worker (Article 6-2-b) (the lex loci contractus)
unless what arises from a series of circumstances is that the employment
contract shows closer ties with another country, in which case the law of
the other country will apply.41 Article 8 of Regulation 593/2008 of June
17, 2008, called Rome I on the law applicable to contractual obligations,
refers to the place from which the employee habitually carries out his
work in performance of the contract. This Regulation concerns contracts
drawn up after it entered into force on December 17, 2009. Is the actual
home port the vessel and its place of administrative registry, the
headquarters of the management firm, or rather the material conditions of
operation of the vessel? Maritime law appears to be undergoing a major
overhaul in view of freedom of vessel flagging, which puts national
social frameworks into competition.
VII. THE NEGATION OF TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING?
The European paradox is that the European Court of Justice denies
any role of collective bargaining in its ruling on Laval & Partnery. The
collective action taken by Swedish trade unions was compliant with
Swedish law, but had a transnational impact. The employer’s freedom of
service provision and the workers’ social rights must be reconciled.
Collective action cannot impose any constraints on the employer beyond
the applicable Community directive.
Directive 96/71/EC concerning posting of workers provides that
guaranteed working conditions for posted workers in the host Member
State are laid down by law, regulation, or administrative provision,
and/or by collective agreements or arbitration awards which have been
declared universally applicable.42 Collective agreements and arbitration

40. Horatia Muir-Watt, ECJ February 5, 2004, DFDS Tor Line, Case C-18/02, 93: 2
R.C.D.I.P. 404 (2004).
41. Olga Fotinopoulou Basurko, Reflexiones acerca de la Ley del Pabellón como
criterio de Conexión conflictual a efectos de la Determinación de la ley aplicable al
contrato de embarque, 24 ANNUAIRE DE DROIT MARITIME ET OCÉANIQUE 261 (2006).
42. BERNARD TEYSSIÉ, DROIT EUROPÉEN DU TRAVAIL 146 (Lexis Nexis 3d ed. 2006);
Umberto Carabelli, Una Sfida Determinante per il Futuro dei Diritti Sociali in Europa:
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awards for the purposes of that provision are those which must be
observed by all undertakings in the geographical area and in the
profession or industry concerned.43 Application of collective agreements
to undertakings that post workers should guarantee equality of treatment
between the latter undertakings and national undertakings in the similarly
positioned profession or industry concerned. The host State can only
impose compliance with its regulations if the salaried employees do not
already benefit from an essentially similar protection under legislation
that mainly applies to them. The application of standards in force in the
host State gives them a true advantage which significantly contributes to
their social protection, and provides that the application of these
standards is proportional to the common objective.
The Swedish law on posting of workers specifies the working and
employment conditions related to matters set out in directive 96/71/EC,
with the exception of minimum wage rates.44 The law says nothing about
pay, which is traditionally determined in Sweden through collective
bargaining between workers and employers. The Swedish system gives
trade union organizations the right to resort to collective action under
certain conditions, in order to compel an employer to begin pay
negotiations or sign a collective agreement. In the case of construction
companies, this sort of system involves a case-by-case negotiation on the
worksite, taking account of the skills, qualifications, and duties of the
salaried employees in question. In practice, since employees belong to
trade unions, employers comply with the collective agreements when
unions ask them to avoid a collective dispute or effective obstruction,
and the public authorities have not had to render these collective
agreements compulsory. The Court of Justice therefore considered that
they are not part of the state-based law where employees are posted.45 In
a way, Scandinavian laws may need a procedure of extension by

la Tutela dei Lavoratori di Fronte alla Libertà di Prestazione dei Servizi Nella CE, 49
WP C.S.D.L.E. 92 (2006) (Italy).
43. See, e.g., Joined Cases 369 & 376/96, Arblade & Fils SARL and Bernard Leloup,
Serge Leloup, Sofrage SARL, 1999 E.C.R. I-8498; Case C-165/98, Criminal Proceedings
Against Mazzoleni and Inter Surveillance Assistance S.A.R.L., 2001 E.C.R. I-2189; Case
C-164/99, Infringement Proceedings against Portugaia Construçoes Lda, 2002 E.C.R. I787; Jean-Philippe Lhernould, Les Salariés Détachés ont-ils Droit au Salaire Minimal
Garanti dans l’Etat d’Accueil?, 6 REVUE DE JURISPRUDENCE SOCIALE 487 (2001).
44. EMIRE Database (European Industrial Relations Glossaries), Sweden – Posting of
Workers, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/SWEDEN/ANCHOR-UTSTATIONER
INGAVARBETSTAGARE-SE.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
45. Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareforbundet,
2007 E.C.R. I-11767.
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ministerial or royal order, as in France or Belgium. The ECJ does not
challenge national law concerning strictly national situations, but it
destabilized Swedish law as confronted with the Community market and
transnational situations.
The Swedish law of 1991 called Lex
Britannia,46 which does not take collective agreements signed abroad into
account and which was validated by the ILO’s expert committee upon a
claim by Swedish ship-owners,47 is discriminatory when the collective
agreement in question has been signed in a Member State of the
European Union. Swedish law should impose the same obligation of
social peace with respect to both Swedish collective agreements and
foreign collective agreements. Community jurisprudence thus promotes
social dumping, since recognizing foreign collective agreements is not
enough to prohibit professional claims or collective action aiming to
extend collective agreements in the State of posting.
Collective action cannot be justified in light of the public interest
objective of protecting workers. This is particularly true where the
negotiations on pay, which collective action seeks to require an
undertaking established in another Member State to enter into, form part
of a national context characterized by a lack of provisions of any kind
that are sufficiently precise and accessible that they do not render it
impossible or excessively difficult in practice for such an undertaking to
determine the obligations with which it is required to comply as regards
minimum pay.48 Collective bargaining must concern precise and
accessible provisions, and the requirement of compliance with wages
agreed upon in Sweden was not sufficiently precise for the Latvian
undertaking.
Consequently, the collective action is limited to

46. EMIRE Database (European Industrial Relations Glossaries), Sweden – Lex
Britannia,
www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/SWEDEN/ANCHOR-LEXBRITANNIASE.htm. Lex Brittania is the popular name for the 1991 amendement to the 1976 CoDetermination Act (Lag (1976:580) om medbestämmande i arbetslivet, 10 juin 1976,
MBL), which restricts the scope of a special ban on industrial action which had been
introduced in a 1989 Labour Court Judgment. The judgment concerned boycott action
against M/S Britannia, a ship flying a flag of convenience, and stated that industrial
action aimed at replacing or amending an existing collective agreement was prohibited
even if the union taking such action was not bound by the agreement concerned. See also
Niklas Bruun, Swedish Labour Law Report, in 13 CROSS-BORDER COLLECTIVE ACTIONS
IN EUROPE: A LEGAL CHALLENGE - A STUDY OF THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSNATIONAL
COLLECTIVE ACTIONS FROM A LABOUR LAW AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
PERSPECTIVE 213 (Filip Dorssemont, Teun Jaspers, & Aukje Van Hoek eds., 2007).
47. Patrick Chaumette, Le classement sans suite de la plainte des armateurs suédois
contre leur gouvernement, D.M.F. 830 (1995).
48. Id.
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compliance with compulsory state law, the statute law determined by the
directive 96/71. Transnational collective action is prohibited in view of
claims exceeding this statute law, which is the negation of the normative
autonomy of workers and employers.49
VIII. WHAT WERE THE REACTIONS?
On April 3, 2008, the Commission published a statement which
clearly states that they will continue to fight social dumping and that the
freedom to provide services is in no way superior to, nor does it oppose,
the fundamental rights to strike and to belong to a trade union.50 The
European Parliament adopted the resolution of October 22, 2008 on
challenges to collective agreements in the EU.51 Article 28 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, adopted in Nice in
December of 2000, codifies the right of collective bargaining and
collective action.52 All the Member States have ratified the following
conventions: ILO-87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organize; ILO-98 on Right to organize and collective
bargaining; ILO-117 on Basic Aims and Standards of Social Policy
(especially Part IV); and ILO-154 on collective bargaining.53 Under the
ILO conventions 87 and 98, restrictions on the right to industrial action

49. See SOPHIE ROBIN-OLIVIER & ETIENNE PATAUT, EUROPE SOCIALE OU EUROPE
(À PROPOS
DES
AFFAIRES
VIKING
ET
LAVAL)
(2008)
http://www.etui.org/en/content/download/9649/50515/file/robinolivierpataud.pdf;
Lise
Casaux-Labrunee, La confrontation des libertés dans l’entreprise, 11 DROIT SOCIAL 1032
(2008); Antonio Jose Ojeda Aviles, Derechos fundamentales de los trabajadores y
libertades fundamentales de los mercados: ¿la ecuación imposible? 217 TRIBUNA
SOCIAL: REVISTA DE SEGURIDAD SOCIAL Y LABORAL 14 (2009) (Spain); Olga
Fotinopoulou Basurko, El asunto “Viking Line”: un litigio que va más allá de la
encrucijada entre las libertades económicas comunitarias y el derecho a la huelga, 217
TRIBUNA SOCIAL: REVISTA DE SEGURIDAD SOCIAL Y LABORAL 40 (2009).
50. EUROPA, EU calls for urgent action to improve working conditions for 1 million
posted workers, IP/08/514 (Apr. 3, 2008),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=IP/08/514.
51. See Report on Challenges to Collective Agreements in the EU, supra note 3.
52. Right
of
collective
bargaining
and
action,
Article
28,
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/rightofco
llectivebargaining.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (“Workers and employers, or their
respective organisations, have, in accordance with Community law and national laws and
practices, the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate
levels and, in cases of conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend their
interests, including strike action.”).
53. See Report on Challenges to Collective Agreements in the EU, supra note 3.
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and fundamental rights can only be justified on grounds of health, public
order, and other similar factors. The European Parliament believes that
the exercise of fundamental rights as recognized in the Member States, in
ILO Conventions, and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union (including the rights to negotiate, conclude, and enforce
collective agreements, and to take industrial action) cannot be put at risk.
These judgments do not challenge national laws and case law on
national collective disputes. They only concern transnational collective
disputes with a European Community dimension. However, it is difficult
to believe that these two realms of the national and transnational will stay
sealed off from each other for long. It is easy to imagine that a national
judge who applies Community law will not take the ECJ’s rulings into
account or consult the ECJ on a question of preliminary interpretation,
but will simply apply his or her national law to transnational collective
actions. This approach would not lead to truly consistent justice. The
national judge could notably base his decision on the ILO-87 and ILO-98
conventions that his country has ratified in order to build a different case
law.54 However, the objective would still be to sway the reasoning of the
ECJ itself.
Seeing that the collective autonomy of workers and employers is
thus negated by the ECJ, could a complaint be filed with the
International Labour Organization, or more specifically, with the
Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts on
the Application of Conventions and Recommendations? Since the
European Union is not a member of the ILO, but simply an observer, it
does not seem possible that the European Trade Union Confederation
(ETUC) could file a complaint directly. These complaints would come
from national trade unions that are members of ETUC, for noncompliance by the ECJ with conventions ILO-87 and ILO-98, ratified by
the Member States. It is not necessary to exhaust national review
possibilities, even if the Committee on Freedom of Association will take
this into account.55 Indeed, no judicial review or appeal is available to
challenge a judgment of the ECJ.

54. Constance Thomas, Martin Oelz & Xavier Beaudonnet, The Use of International
Labour Law in Domestic Courts: Theory, Recent Jurisprudence, and Practical
Implications, in LES NORMES INTERNATIONALES DU TRAVAIL: UN PATRIMOINE POUR
L’AVENIR, MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE NICOLAS VALTICOS 249 (Jean-Claude Javillier
& Bermard Gernigon eds., Geneva: International Labor Organization) (2004).
55. See Eric Gravel, Les Mécanismes de Contrôle de l’OIT : Bilan de Leur Efficacité
et Perspectives d’Avenir, in LES NORMES INTERNATIONALES DU TRAVAIL: UN PATRIMOINE
POUR L’AVENIR, MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE NICOLAS VALTICOS (Jean-Claude Javillier
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The Council of Europe’s European Social Charter, revised in 1996,
asserts the rights of workers and employers to collective bargaining and
to collective actions.56 For a long time, the European Court of Human
Rights based its reasoning on a restrictive interpretation of this Article,
excluding collective bargaining from the scope of Article 11 of the 1950
Convention that sanctioned freedom of association and freedom of
unions.57 Consultation of unions and collective bargaining were simply
means, amongst others, that States could implement to ensure the
freedom of unions. On April 25, 1996, in the case of Gustafsson v.
Sweden, the European Court accepted the legitimate nature of collective
bargaining in refusing the right of an employer to avoid the application
of a collective agreement, even on the grounds of his freedom to not join
a union.58 The European Court finally admitted that for Turkish civil
servants, this freedom of association and union freedom contained the
right to collective bargaining.59 It must be noted that the freedom of
collective bargaining does not exist without the right to union action.

& Bernard Gernigon eds., Geneva: International Labor Organization) (2004); Alberto
Odero & Maria Marta Travieso, Le comité de la liberté syndicale (II) : composition,
procédure et fonctionnement, in LES NORMES INTERNATIONALES DU TRAVAIL: UN
PATRIMOINE POUR L’AVENIR, MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE NICOLAS VALTICOS 195
(Jean-Claude Javillier & Bernard Gernigon eds., Geneva: International Labor
Organization) (2004).
56. European Social Charter (revised) Strasbourg, 3.V.1996 - Article 6
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/163.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2009)
(“The right to bargain collectively - With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the
right to bargain collectively, the Parties undertake:
1. to promote joint consultation between workers and employers;2. to promote,
where necessary and appropriate, machinery for voluntary negotiations between
employers or employers’ organisations and workers’ organisations, with a view to
the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective
agreements;
3. to promote the establishment and use of appropriate machinery for conciliation
and voluntary arbitration for the settlement of labour disputes; and recognize;
4. the right of workers and employers to collective action in cases of conflicts of
interest, including the right to strike, subject to obligations that might arise out of
collective agreements previously entered into.”).
57. See Swedish Engine Drivers Union v. Sweden, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 617 (1976);
ALAIN CARILLON, LES SOURCES EUROPÉENNES DES DROITS DE L’HOMME SALARIÉ 410
(Bruylant 2006), available at http://www.bruylant.be/pdf/12541.pdf?PHPSESSID=
a4978cb6857eb8f808995364069a8d0f.
58. Gustafsson v. Sweden, 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 637 (1996).
59. Demir v. Turkey, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1056 (2008); Pierre Marguenaud & Jean
Mouly, Le droit à la négociation collective, partie inséparable de la liberté syndicale,
J.C.P./La Semaine Juridique 2007-G-10038.
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Thus, European jurisprudence with respect to human rights could be
based on the autonomy of social law, autonomy over which the economic
jurisprudence of the Community, based on the Internal Market’s
operation, has ridden roughshod. It appears that European economic and
social cohesion must be based on the duality of European jurisdictions,
and a dialogue between them.
IX. CONCLUSION: WHY SHOULD THE ECJ’S INTERPRETATION BE
MODIFIED?
The autonomy of workers and employers is simply the only good
way to resolve collective labor disputes.60 Subordinated work, where the
health and safety of the worker are at stake, and where a worker’s pay
depends on the labor market, cannot remain within a context of strictly
individual contracts nor in a legal framework which is purely state
legislation and regulation-based. One of the great novelties of social law
has been to give workers and employers a role in setting standards,
which has spilled over beyond the field of labor relations into that of
institutions for social protection. This collective autonomy has a
civilizing influence on labor relations. Denying collective autonomy
means encouraging social violence.
This violence, arising from social dumping, became clearly visible
recently in the case of posted Italian and Portuguese service providers
used to maintain Total’s refineries in the United Kingdom.61 These were
not specialized subcontractors with skills that British companies did not
possess. They were used as a way of getting around one part of British
law, and especially collective labor agreements. This subcontracting
caused a scandal, coming as it did at a time of financial crisis and rapidly
rising unemployment, as well as record profits for the global oil
corporation in question. Some of the posted employees had to be housed
on barges. Since they were not U.K. residents, what social protection
were they afforded? Passions ran high and the reactions from the British,
which seemed to have an anti-foreigner bent, spun out of the unions’
control. Such issues resulted from a shortcoming in Community social
law, encouragement of social dumping, and workers put into direct
competition without any attempt to improve productivity or quality of
service. In the absence of rules accepted by all, or rules which are
60. Autonomy of workers and employers may even prevent such disputes.
61. Greg Thomson, United Kingdom: A Total dispute, METIS – CORRESPONDANCES
EUROPÉENES DU TRAVAIL (Feb. 15, 2009), http://www.metiseurope.eu/united-kingdom-atotal-dispute_en_70_art_28219.html.
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negotiated or negotiable, it is a power struggle that prevails, with
opposition to what is mistakenly identified as the “law” of the market.
Cross-Channel and cross-Baltic shipping links have shown the necessity
of both collective bargaining and EC coordination of links between EU
states.62

62. PATRICK CHAUMETTE, Marine Marchande, Travail et Navigation: Quelle
Articulation Normative?, in L’UNION EUROPÉENNE ET LA MER 115 (2007).

